More new research papers presented at the Economic History Society conference

The Society celebrated its centenary with a major international conference from Friday 10 April 2026 to Sunday 12 April 2026 at the London School of Economics, highlighting a century of scholarship and unveiling new research that reshapes our understanding of the economic past.

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The Economic History Society’s annual conference continued over the weekend, with a rich programme of papers and discussions on Saturday 11 April and Sunday 12 April 2026. Building on the momentum of the opening sessions, the final two days brought together scholars from across the field to present new research, exchange ideas and reflect on the evolving directions of economic history.

Saturday’s sessions showcased a diverse range of topics, spanning long-run economic development, historical labour markets, financial systems, and the economic consequences of political change. Presenters offered fresh empirical insights and methodological approaches, highlighting the continued vitality and interdisciplinarity of the field. Discussions were lively, with participants engaging critically with new datasets, comparative perspectives, and innovative interpretations of historical evidence.

On Sunday, the conference maintained its strong pace, with further panels exploring themes such as inequality, trade, institutions, and the interaction between economic and social structures over time. The papers presented demonstrated both the depth and breadth of current research, as well as a growing emphasis on global and comparative perspectives.

The conference concluded with the Tawney Lecture, delivered by Professor Morgan Kelly of University College Dublin, entitled “Historical Economics versus Economic History.”

A summary of selected papers presented on Saturday and Sunday can be found below.

CAPITALISM IN THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES AD: HOW ROMAN EGYPT REVEALS 2,000 YEARS OF INEQUALITY

A new study drawing on one of the richest datasets from the ancient world challenges how we understand Roman-era financial markets—and the people who used them. Based on more than 4,300 surviving papyri from Roman Egypt (AD 1–350), the paper reconstructs everyday economic life, revealing how ordinary individuals—not just elites—borrowed, invested, and navigated financial risk.

The research, by Paul Kelly of the London School of Economics, asks two central questions: were ancient financial decisions driven by rational profit-seeking, or by social norms such as reciprocity? And what do these markets reveal about wealth inequality and social mobility? The dataset is unusually detailed, even including physical identifiers like scars—many linked to agricultural work—showing that a large share of market participants were working farmers rather than wealthy elites.

Using evidence on returns and risks across unsecured loans, mortgages, housing, and land, the study constructs a clear financial hierarchy. It finds that secured mortgage lending and agricultural land markets behaved like modern markets, with decisions driven by financial returns. By contrast, unsecured lending and housing were shaped more by social relationships, such as trust and reciprocity.

The findings on inequality are stark. Returns on assets consistently exceeded overall economic growth, implying persistent or increasing wealth concentration. A stochastic model of household finances shows that while financial ruin was a constant risk, the probability of upward mobility was extremely low. The model also helps explain severe outcomes, including infant abandonment driven by economic distress.

The broader message is strikingly contemporary. Far from being uniquely modern, many of the challenges associated with capitalism—unequal access to opportunity, increasingly concentrated wealth and fragile household finances—were already present two thousand years ago. The evidence suggests that sophisticated financial markets can coexist with deep inequality, highlighting how enduring these economic dynamics have been across history.

To contact the author:

Author: Paul Kelly

Affiliation: London School of Economics

Email: p.v.kelly@lse.ac.uk.

THE LONG SHADOW OF SERVITUDE:
HOW INEQUALITY PERSISTED ACROSS GENERATIONS IN AMERICA

A new study reveals how deeply inequality can persist—even across centuries. Examining the descendants of some of the most disadvantaged migrants to early America, it finds that economic disadvantage endured for generations, even in the absence of formal barriers to mobility. The paper asks: does inequality fade over time, or can it remain embedded long after initial conditions disappear?

The research, by Taylan Alpkaya of the University of Mannheim, focuses on indentured servants and transported convicts sent from Britain to the American colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries—groups who made up a large share of early migrants and who, after serving their terms, faced no formal legal barriers to advancement. To track their long-run outcomes, the study constructs a unique dataset of 47,000 transported convicts and 100,000 migrants overall, covering around 30% of all colonial arrivals. Using surname-based methods, the author traces descendants across generations and links them to U.S. Census records from 1790 through 1940.

The results are striking. By 1850, individuals with convict ancestry were 9% less likely to own property, 22% less likely to be household heads, and 57% more likely to be illiterate than other white Americans. These gaps proved remarkably persistent: even by 1940, descendants were still 7% less likely to own a home and 11% less likely to have non-wage income. Similar patterns hold for descendants of indentured servants, but not for free migrants.

The study shows that initial economic disadvantage—not legal discrimination—drove these long-run effects, with inequality transmitted across generations.

The broader message is clear and highly relevant today: even when formal barriers disappear, inequality can endure for centuries, raising important questions about mobility, opportunity, and the long shadow of historical disadvantage.

To contact the author:

Author: Taylan Alpkaya

Affiliation: University of Mannheim

Email: taylan.alpkaya@uni-mannheim.de

WOMEN DIDN’T ALWAYS LIVE LONGER: HOW INEQUALITY SHORTENED FEMALE LIVES FOR CENTURIES

A new study challenges one of today’s most widely accepted demographic facts: that women live longer than men. Using evidence from China over nearly a millennium, it shows that this female survival advantage is a recent development—and that, historically, social inequality often reversed it.

The paper, by Sijie Hu & Zhiwu Chen (University of Hong Kong) and Kaixiang Peng (Wuhan University), asks a fundamental question: how have gender differences in lifespan evolved over the long run, and what role did social structures play? To answer this, the study constructs a unique genealogical dataset covering 3.6 million individuals (including 1.8 million married couples) born between 1000 and 1960. This allows the authors to track lifespan patterns and compare husbands and wives across centuries.

The results reveal a striking pattern. In early life, women faced significantly higher mortality in their teens and twenties, largely due to the risks associated with childbirth. While women who survived into later adulthood tended to outlive men—reflecting biological advantages—this was often offset by social conditions that reduced female survival overall.

The analysis shows that family structure and gender norms played a crucial role. Having children increased lifespan for both men and women, but the benefits were stronger for women, suggesting the importance of family-based support. At the same time, polygyny and larger spousal age gaps extended men’s lives while reducing women’s longevity, highlighting unequal resource allocation within households.

The broader message is clear and highly relevant today: biology alone does not determine life expectancy—social inequality can override it. The modern pattern of women outliving men is not inevitable, but the result of long-term improvements in health and gender equality.

To contact the author:

Authors: Zhiwu Chen, Sijie Hu, Zhan Lin, and Kaixiang Peng

Affiliations: The University of Hong Kong, Renmin University of China, and Wuhan University

Email: sijiehu@hku.hk

TRAPPED WITHOUT WORK:
WHY UP TO 90% OF LAID-OFF BRITONS COULDN’T FIND NEW JOBS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION

At the height of Britain’s Great Depression, losing your job often meant staying unemployed—not for weeks, but indefinitely. New research, by Meredith Paker of Oxford University, shows that during the Great Depression, as many as 90% of workers laid off from an industry failed to find work in another industry.

This paper reveals that Britain’s unemployment crisis wasn’t just severe—it was structurally unequal. While national unemployment topped 20% in the early 1930s, the burden fell disproportionately on certain workers. For workers in textile manufacturing such as the cotton industry, unemployment reached over 37%, compared to just 16% for workers in the service sector.

One key factor? Whether workers could move into new industries.

Using newly digitised labour data covering 100 industries, the research shows dramatic differences in mobility. Workers in declining sectors such as textiles faced job-finding rates near zero, meaning most remained stuck unemployed. By contrast, workers in services were up to five times more likely to transition into new jobs.

The divide widened during the Depression. Overall labour mobility collapsed—from around 25% of displaced workers finding new jobs in the late 1920s to just 10% during the early 1930s.

Some groups faced hidden disadvantages. Women, despite lower overall unemployment rates, faced significantly fewer opportunities to move between industries because of their concentration in a narrower set of jobs.

Across the economy, when industries declined, barriers to moving into new types of work played a central role in turning job loss into prolonged unemployment. The result was a “double penalty”: those most likely to lose their jobs were also the least likely to recover. The findings suggest that economic crises are not just about how many jobs disappear—but about who has the ability to adapt when they do.

Full paper available here:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4629039

To contact the author:

Author: Meredith Paker

Affiliation: University of Oxford

Email: meredith.paker@all-souls.ox.ac.uk

THE ORIGINAL WORK-FROM-HOME REVOLUTION:
HOW SEWING MACHINES TRANSFORMED WOMEN’S WORK AND CHILDREN’S FUTURES

A new study shows that one of the most iconic 19th-century inventions—the home sewing machine—did more than save time: it helped transform women’s work and improve children’s life chances. While debates today focus on how technology disrupts jobs, this research highlights how it can also expand opportunities from within the household.

The paper, by Esther Arenas Arroyo of the Vienna University of Economics and Business, asks: can domestic technologies boost women’s economic participation and drive long-run mobility? To answer this, it tracks the spread of Singer sewing machines across U.S. counties in the late 19th century. The author builds a novel dataset from historical newspapers identifying when Singer agents first arrived in each location, and links this to full-count census data on women and children. This allows for a causal analysis exploiting the staggered rollout of the technology.

The results are striking. Access to sewing machines significantly increased women’s employment in dressmaking: after 10 years, employment rose by around 28% relative to baseline levels, with even larger gains for single female household heads. At the same time, children benefited. Each additional year of exposure reduced child labour by about 2% and increased school attendance, with effects accumulating over time.

The long-run impacts persisted into adulthood. Children exposed to sewing machines experienced higher literacy, improved employment prospects, and greater intergenerational mobility, alongside lower fertility.

The study’s message is highly relevant today: technologies that enable work from home can do more than change how we work—they can expand women’s economic independence and improve outcomes for the next generation.

Full paper available here:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5633034

To contact the author:

Author: Esther Arenas Arroyo

Affiliation: Vienna University of Economics and Business

Email: esther.arenas.arroyo@wu.ac.at

ART AS AN ASSET CLASS:
HOW 19TH-CENTURY INVESTORS USED PAINTINGS TO BUILD WEALTH

A new study shows that investing beyond traditional assets is far from a modern innovation. Long before today’s interest in alternative assets, wealthy investors in the 19th century were already diversifying into art—treating paintings not just as cultural objects, but as stores of wealth and financial investments.

The paper, by Luisa Bicalho Ritzkat of the London School of Economics, asks a simple but important question: how did art perform as an asset class during the rise of modern capitalism? Focusing on Britain and France between 1800 and 1914, it examines whether art played a meaningful role in investment portfolios alongside stocks and bonds. The study constructs the first annual price indices for art markets in both countries, drawing on a novel dataset that combines the Getty Provenance Index with hand-collected auction records from sources such as Algernon Graves and Mireur. These indices allow for direct comparison with contemporary financial returns.

Note: The figure plots the British art price index and two equity market indices at annual frequency, normalized to 100 in 1813. The FT100 is drawn from Global Financial Data (GFD), while the second equity index is by Golez and Koudijs (2018) and Campbell, Grossman, and Turner (2021).

The results reveal striking differences across markets. In Britain, art prices rose sharply in the second half of the century, eventually outperforming domestic equities in nominal terms, though with significantly higher volatility. In France, by contrast, art consistently underperformed equities. Unlike stocks and bonds—which moved closely together across countries as markets integrated—art returns remained largely uncorrelated between Britain and France, reflecting a segmented market with London specialising in Old Masters and Paris in contemporary works.

The findings highlight that art was not a fringe asset, but a core component of elite wealth during a period of rising inequality. The broader lesson is clear: the diversification of wealth into alternative assets has deep historical roots, and the relationship between culture and capital has long shaped how fortunes are built and preserved.

To contact the author:

Author: Luisa Bicalho Ritzkat

Affiliation: London School of Economics

Email: l.bicalho-ritzkat@lse.ac.uk

HOW THE BLACK DEATH ACCELERATED RISING LABOUR POWER IN MEDIEVAL ECONOMIES

A new study challenges one of the most widely held views in economic history: that the Black Death fundamentally transformed labour markets and improved workers’ fortunes. Instead, the research finds evidence that many of these changes were already underway before the plague struck.

The paper, based on research by Spike Gibbs (King’s College London), Jordan Claridge (London School of Economics) and Vincent Delabastita (Radboud Universiteit), asks a central question: did the Black Death cause a structural shift in how income was shared between landowners and workers, or did it simply accelerate existing trends? To answer this, the authors develop a new measure of economic change—the manorial labour share of revenue, or the proportion of agricultural output going to workers.

Using detailed manorial accounts, the study reconstructs labour costs —including both wages and in-kind benefits—across English estates between 1209 and 1411. This approach captures all labour inputs, from customary labour to waged day workers, to long-term employees, providing a more complete picture than previous studies.

The findings challenge conventional wisdom. Rather than a sharp break after the Black Death, the share of income going to labour was already rising at many locations from the early 14th century onwards. Moreover, many landowners were deriving an increasing share of their revenues from livestock rearing, rather than growing crops, from the late 13th century, further evidence that structural shifts in production occurred before the Black Death.

The results suggest that long-run institutional and economic changes—not just sudden shocks—were key in improving workers’ position.

The broader implication is clear: even major crises may not reshape economies as dramatically as often assumed. Instead, they can reinforce deeper structural trends already in motion, offering a more nuanced view of how labour markets evolve over time.

To contact the primary author:

Author: Spike Gibbs
Affiliation: King’s College London

Email: spike.gibbs@kcl.ac.uk

PANIC WITHOUT COLLAPSE: HOW FEAR DROVE FINANCIAL TURMOIL IN 1930s CHINA

A new study by Xiaoyun Tang (King’s College London) challenges the conventional assumption that panic follows real economic collapse. By examining the Chinese economy during the height of the Great Depression, the research demonstrates that intense market anxiety can take on a life of its own, independent of the actual stability of financial institutions. This period in Chinese history serves as a critical laboratory for understanding how psychological contagion operates in the absence of banking collapse.

The central inquiry of the paper investigates how financial panic emerged in the absence of systemic failure? To answer this, the researchers focused on the volatile years between 1933 and 1935, synthesizing archival banking records with a massive, newly constructed dataset comprising 72 Chinese and English-language newspapers. By applying advanced natural language processing to this media archive, the study meticulously tracks the evolution of financial sentiment and the dissemination of fear-based narratives across diverse audiences, ranging from local domestic savers to sophisticated foreign investors.

The resulting data reveals a startling disconnect between institutional reality and public perception. While the Chinese banking sector remained remarkably resilient with no widespread failures, the media landscape of the time told a different story of mounting dread and localized bank runs. A telling example of this divergence lies in the sector-wide deposit data: even as contemporary press coverage described mounting crisis and credit collapse, bank deposits grew by more than 15 percent per year between 1929 and 1931, and aggregate credit availability reached its highest levels in the period from 1933 to 1935.

This phenomenon suggests that while the “panic” was real, actual financial behavior did not mirror it—and that public trust, far from disappearing entirely, often shifted toward larger, better-capitalised institutions rather than evaporating from the system as a whole. Spatial analysis further clarifies that financial anxiety was most acute in Shanghai, which by 1934 housed 59 banks—nearly 40 percent of all Chinese banking institutions—and served as the nerve centre of the national financial system. In this environment, soaring interbank lending rates (rising from around 6 percent in 1934 to 26 percent by 1935), intense international press coverage, and the visibility of silver outflows amplified anxieties far beyond what the underlying aggregate data warranted. Critically, however, the banking sector’s response was strategic rather than panicked: institutions shifted investments toward government bonds in a “flight to quality,” maintaining solvency while reducing direct lending exposure.

The broader lesson is striking and remains relevant today. China’s 1930s experience reveals that financial instability is not always driven by collapsing fundamentals; it can be driven by the narratives that circulate about those fundamentals. Reports in 1935 described a severe credit crunch that the balance-sheet data simply do not support. In an age of rapid information flows and social media, understanding how fear can diverge from—and potentially amplify—underlying economic conditions may be just as important as understanding the economics themselves.

To contact the author:

Author: Xiaoyun Tang

Affiliation: King’s College London

Email: xiaoyun.tang@kcl.ac.uk

Website: xiaoyuntang.com